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INTRODUCTION
For more than 30 years, political analysts and practitioners have debated the question of whether divisive primary campaigns-where the margin of victory between the winner and loser is narrow-are detrimental to a political party's chances of winning in general elections (Hacker 1965; Lengle 1980 Lengle , 1981 Stone 1984 Stone , 1986 Buell 1986 While inconsistent findings abound in the general research on primaries, the conclusion that divisive presidential primaries hurt Democratic contenders' chances of winning presidential elections has been consistently supported using both aggregate (Lengle 1980 (Lengle , 1981 Kenney and Rice 1987) and individual (Lengle 1980; Southwell 1986 ; Stone 1986) level data. These studies employ a variety of measures of divisiveness, control variables, and statistical methodologies to reach simi-lar conclusions. With this study we join the debate by presenting the most comprehensive investigation to date of the effects of nominating mechanisms on presidential election outcomes.
DIVISIVE PRIMARIES REVISITED
Our study differs from, and builds upon, previous research in several notable ways. First, we employ the most expansive data set ever used in this kind of analysis-the entire population of state-level election data from 1932 to 1992.
Next, we restrict our analysis to the Democratic party only. The existing literature suggests that primary divisiveness is more consequential for Democratic candidates than Republican candidates. The pluralistic base, cross-cutting cleavages, and wide ideological range that have been characteristic of the Democratic party since its transformation from minority to majority party status in the 1930s sow the seeds of conflict among the party elite as well as between the elite and the mass membership over the rules, role, priorities, and direction of the party. The minority status, homogeneous membership, and philosophical coherence of the GOP inoculate it to some degree from the effects of divisiveness. We begin our own study with the 1932 presidential election to test for the effects of divisiveness during this entire period of Democratic ascendancy.
Third, we have expanded the scope of the inquiry by comparing the effects of two types of presidential nominating mechanisms-presidential primaries and caucuses-on party success rates in general elections. Previous research focused on primaries exclusively.
To remain consistent with the literature, we have borrowed the dichotomous indicator of divisiveness initially devised by Bernstein (1977) to study congressional elections and used by Lengle (1980 Lengle ( , 1981 to study presidential elections. Under this classification scheme, a primary is considered divisive if the margin of victory between the winner and runner-up is 20% or less. Just as in previous studies at the aggregate level, our work includes controls for the effects of incumbency and state party orientation.
Finally, we have extended earlier research in another major respect. The original studies employed multivariate contingency table analysis. We follow up this research by using probit to estimate the probability of a state voting Republican as a function of divisiveness, incumbency, and party orientation.
NOMINATING MECHANISMS, DIVISIVENESS, AND ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
One major limitation of the current literature is that the relationship between divisiveness and election outcomes is tested for one type of nominating mechanism only-the direct primary. The exclusive focus on primaries in the literature is understandable. Primaries are the nominating method of choice at the congressional, state, and local level. We believe, however, that divisiveness varies reliably by nominating mechanism. Different nominating systems, by virtue of their inherent characteristics, are susceptible to greater or lesser degrees of divisiveness. A nominating process that is quick, less visible, party-centered, and elite controlled, for instance, is likely to be less polarizing, and hence, less divisive, than a method which is protracted, more visible, candidate-centered, and mass controlled. Direct primaries fit the latter type. The focus on presidential elections allows us to compare the effects of two types of nominating mechanisms-presidential primary and caucus-on general election outcomes.
Caucuses by their very nature are likely to be less divisive than primaries for a number of reasons. Campaigns in caucus states are less visible to the party membership than those in primary states. With the exception of the Iowa caucuses, fewer candidates participate, less money is spent, fewer ads are run, and less media coverage is generated. As a result, the party membership in caucus states compared with primary states tends to be less interested, less attentive, less actively involved, and less likely to develop strong emotional and political attachments to candidates. In sum, they are less willing to participate in the process at all. On this last point, the historical record is quite clear: turnout in caucuses is much lower than in primaries. Only 1%-3% of the voting-age population participate in caucuses, whereas 20%-25% vote in primaries (Ranney 1972 (Ranney , 1977 Lengle 1992 ).
More importantly, however, there is a fundamental difference in the function of primaries and caucuses. For most of the twentieth century, caucuses were responsible, primarily, for conducting party business and, secondarily, for selecting delegates. Party members who attended caucuses may have preferred different candidates for president, but the caucus was a forum to set party rules, plot campaign strategy, disseminate information, choose party officeholders, and select party leaders to the next round of caucuses-not to decide upon a presidential nominee.
The responsibility for choosing the nominee in a caucus-based nominating process rested with the national convention. Thus, if divisiveness arose during the nominating campaign, it arose at the national convention where avenues existed to resolve the conflict and unite the party. Losing factions were offered patronage, pork barrel, policy concessions, or the vice presidency by the winning faction in return for their support in the general election. Divisiveness was reduced through the bargaining and negotiating inherent in a deliberative nominating mechanism.
The purpose of primaries, however, is to measure popular support for presidential contenders. By their very nature, therefore, primaries invite internal party dissension if not civil war. They compel candidates to criticize and malign one another before a statewide and national audience and encourage party members to divide themselves into opposing camps. Negative and deceptive advertising blankets the airwaves and reinforces voter loyalty and antipathy toward candidates. In a presidential primary, the price of victory for the winner is a tarnished image and a split party, and there is no consolation prize for losers. Our argument is not that divisiveness is absent in caucuses and present in primaries, but that the magnitude of the problem is less and the number of party members affected is fewer in caucuses than in primaries.
The effect of different nominating mechanisms on party (dis)harmony and electoral outcomes is an especially interesting question given the recent changes in the presidential nominating process over the last 20 years. Before 1972, an overwhelming majority of states used caucuses to select delegates to the Democratic National Convention, and a small minority used primaries. Since 1972, the ratio of caucuses to primaries has been reversed. 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 Primaries + Caucuses Incumbency also might explain the relationship between divisiveness and electoral success. The party out of office is likely to experience divisive primaries because its nomination is open and also more likely to lose the general election because it does not control the resources of the Oval Office. The incumbent party, on the other hand, would have fewer contested nominations and more general election success. Over time the result would be the same for the Democratic party: more nondivisive primaries and more victories when competing as the incumbent party, and more divisive primaries and losses when competing as the out-party. The explanation for failure and success would be incumbency, not divisiveness. the national average for either party (e.g., in presidential elections with major third party or independent candidates) were categorized as "two-party competitive." Alaska and Hawaii could not be classified until each had experienced three election cycles in 1972.
This measure of traditional party orientation is identical to the one used by Lengle (1980) . The purpose of the measure is to capture party orientation at the presidential level only. Including state and local voting history in the measure is inappropriate since states have different political orientations at different electoral levels. The South, for instance, is traditionally Republican at the presidential level but Democratic at the state and local levels. Also, since "tradition" does not preclude the possibility of change, and since state party traditions have changed over time (e.g., South), we kept the number of past elections low to capture change across time without stacking the deck to our advantage.
The validity of the measure is supported by the strength of the relationship between state party orientation and candidate choice. Tau,= .38. To test for this possibility, table 3 controls our findings for the effects of incumbency.3 As table 3 shows, divisiveness takes its toll regardless of incumbency, while caucuses benefit the party in two of three instances. In election years with Democratic incumbents, divisiveness severely handicaps the party. Democrats lose 88% of the divisive primary states, but win 69% of the nondivisive primary and 3If the Democratic incumbent sought renomination, the election year was coded "Democratic incumbent." If the Republican incumbent sought renomination, the election year was coded "Republican incumbent." If the incumbent president either could not run or chose not to run, the election year was coded "no incumbent." 74% of the caucus states. In years with no incumbents, Democrats lose 85% of the divisive primary states, but only 75% of nondivisive states and 66% of caucus states. During election years with Republican incumbent, Democrats lose 71% of the divisive primary states but fare far better in the nondivisive primary and caucus states.
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF STATE VOTE CHOICE
We now take an additional step in our analysis by estimating a probit model4 to determine the influence of type of nominating mechanism/divisiveness, state party orientation, and incumbency on presidential vote choice.' Table 4 presents the results of the analysis. The probit coefficients demonstrate that all of the variables we employ in the analysis, with the exception of a state having a Republican incumbent, are statistically significant, and the signs are in the expected direction. Democratic state party orientation and party of the incumbent are negatively related to voting Republican.6 The goodness of fit statistics indicate that the model fits the data reasonably well. Seventy-one percent of the cases were correctly classified, the pseudo R2 = .26, and the asymptotic F-statistic is significant.
The results of the probit analysis further support our contention that divisive Democratic primaries help elect Republicans, and caucuses help elect Democrats even after controlling for state party orientation and incumbency. As table 4 demonstrates, the probability of voting Republican is highest for divisive primary states and lowest for caucus states for every combination of state party orientation and incumbency. Again, we find that divisiveness is the factor that renders primaries damaging to the Democrats, as the differences in the probability of losing nondivisive primaries and caucuses are small. Although Democrats do best in "friendly" states in elections with Democratic incumbents, the effect of nominating mechanism on performance is nonetheless dramatic. A Democratic incumbent has a 29% chance of losing a "friendly" state after a divisive primary, and only an 8% chance of losing a "friendly state" which employs a caucus system. The worst scenario for Democrats occurs in "hostile" states with a predominantly Republican culture. Democrats lose "hostile" states 97% of the time when a divisive primary has occurred, compared with 87% when a caucus has been held. The Democratic party does not fare well when a divisive primary has taken place in a competitive state holding an election for an open seat. Democrats lose 78% of the time under these conditions. However, they face a 51% chance of winning if a caucus is held.
CONCLUSION
The relationships uncovered in this study should not be surprising to students of political parties, generally, and of party reform, specifically. Historically, party success has been intricately tied to formal institutional mechanisms and procedures for selecting party nominees (Ranney 1975 Lengle 1987 ). Consequently, any changes in these rules and mechanisms affect the legitimacy of the de-cision, the quality of the nominees, the attitudes and loyalty of party members, the power of groups and states within the party coalition, and, ultimately, the competitiveness of the party in the electoral arena.
From a more technical perspective, our findings lay a foundation for future theoretical and empirical investigations using both aggregate and individual-level data. One way to test the "divisive primary hypothesis" further is to refine the core concept of "divisiveness." The use of a 20% margin leaves many unanswered questions which can be addressed by using the "actual margin of victory" in the analySiS.7 For example, is the relationship between candidate choice and margin of victory strictly linear? Do Democratic party prospects improve as the margin of victory increases? Are primaries decided by 40% one-half as divisive and, therefore, one-half as detrimental to Democratic party success as primaries decided by 20%?
Aside from specific measurement issues, the concept of divisiveness also can be more carefully specified by taking into account the dynamics of nominating campaigns. Undoubtedly, some primaries decided by less than 20% can be less divisive than other primaries decided by more than 20%. Contextual factors, including the size of the field of candidates running in a state and the stage of the campaign at which a primary takes place, can influence levels of divisiveness in a state.
While our study answers conclusively one important question using aggregatelevel data, it also raises many other related ones at the individual level. Obviously, our findings suggest that political loyalties, attitudes, and perceptions of voters in nominating campaigns are influenced enormously by the structure and intensity of the competition fostered by nominating mechanisms. The voters' psychological and political reaction to bitterly fought nominating campaigns does not disappear after the national convention. Instead, it remains with the voters and becomes part of the mind set that influences their behavior in general elections. Issues concerning the relationship of divisive primaries to the development of voters' short-and long-term attitudes toward candidates, political parties, and the political process, their willingness to work for the presidential nominee, and their propensity to turn out in the general election need to be explored. Only when such studies have been conducted can we hope to understand more fully the divisive primary phenomenon.
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